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International Choice of Law in Trademark Disputes From a 
Territorial Approach to a Global Approach 
By Edouard Treppoz* 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been observed that international choice of law in trademark disputes 
reveals a tension between law and economics.1  From an economic perspective, 
marks can be exploited on a worldwide scale, and their value may be based on the 
global market.  From a legal perspective, however, the rules are less than uniform.  
Law does not recognize one worldwide mark.  Many trademarks are granted on a 
local basis, within local protective regimes that are independent of one another.  
Although the market has become global, the legal protection remains local.  This 
tension has increased with the advent of the Internet.  First, the universal access 
technology provides seems to reduce the relevance of a territorial approach and 
increase the need for a global economic approach.  Second, the Internet has 
contributed to the creation of certain globally powerful companies.  Those 
companies use, and benefit from, the universality of technology to make services 
available all over the world.  From a technology-oriented point of view, the 
localized protection of trademark seems parochial.  It is likely that the modern 
world requires a shift from local to international trademark protection.2 
Such a shift will not happen quickly.  Intellectual property generally and 
trademark in particular are viewed as means of regulating markets, and the 
geographic scope of markets has historically been smaller than it is today.  
Regulation was therefore local and territorial.  It was the creation of a single 
European market that allowed regulators to overcome the principle of territoriality.  
In this context, one key advancement was the principle of free movement of goods, 
creating a regional exhaustion of intellectual property rights.3  A second, more 
radical advancement was the development of the unitary trademark.4  In Europe, 
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trademark protection has moved from a national scope to a European scope.  But 
even with a single European market, some resistance remains against expanding 
uniform coverage of intellectual property laws.  In particular, the creation of a 
unitary patent has been a long and complicated undertaking,5 not yet completely 
achieved.6  On the other end of the intellectual property spectrum, copyright law is 
still territorial at a European level, despite the will of the European Commission.7   
Even within a single regional market, overcoming territoriality in IP is not an 
easy task, and overcoming territoriality at the international level appears a distant 
dream.  Notably, the fact that Article 6 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
to Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) does not regulate the exhaustion 
right seems to preclude such a shift from territorial to international protection.8  
Does this mean that territoriality should and will govern trademark disputes for 
many years to come? Not necessarily.  Some intermediary solutions exist between 
local and international protection.  Focus has shifted from attempts to harmonize 
national laws to the use of private international law, including choice of law and 
jurisdictional agreements, to overcome a strict territoriality.9  Some remarkable 
works offer guidance on how to overcome an overly territorial view and correctly 
handle the complications presented by the Internet,10 including:  (1) the Principles 
Governing Jurisdiction, Choice of Law and Judgments in Transnational Disputes 
(ALI Principles);11 (2) the Principles on Conflict of Laws in Intellectual Property 
(CLIP Principles)12 and (3) two sets of Asian principles.13  National or regional 
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U.N.T.S. 299, 322 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 9. See Francois Dessemontet, The Emergence of Private International Law of Intellectual 
Property, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY—A NEW FRAME FOR NEW 
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approaches should integrate these methods of improvement in order to reduce the 
gap between sound economics and law. 
Part I of this Article will be dedicated to a comparison between European and 
American law, demonstrating how those two systems endorse a territorial 
approach.  Part II will explain the perseverance of such a territorial approach, 
despite the growth of the Internet.  For example, the owner of a mark protected and 
exploited on a worldwide basis must adjudicate cyber-infringements on a local 
basis, and such fragmented adjudication diminishes the strength of protection and 
encourages would-be infringers.14  Part III will propose reforms in light of the ALI 
and CLIP Principles.  The consensus between those principles, recommending 
litigation in one place and applying a single law to cases of cyber infringement, 
offers strong guidance for overcoming strict territoriality and bridging the gap 
between law and economics.  Where those principles diverge as to the law 
applicable to secondary liability, one recommendation is to choose the solution 
offering the best balance between the interests at stake. 
I.  THE ENDORSEMENT OF A TERRITORIAL APPROACH 
It might first appear paradoxical to study European and American approaches in 
a field that is increasingly governed by international conventions.  However, those 
conventions do not impose any choice of law requirements, though they clearly 
lean toward a territorial view.15  The goal was to prevent discrimination against 
foreigners by imposing a rule of national treatment.16  This should not technically 
be characterized as a choice of law rule because it allows private international law 
to select the relevant approach.  However, it is true that Article 6 of the Paris 
Convention recognizes independent protection of the same marks in different 
countries.17  Recognition of the independence among national trademarks leads to a 
territorial and fragmented approach to trademark protection.  The comparison 
between the European and American legal systems reveals a strong endorsement of 
a territorial approach to trademarks disputes.  Under both systems, an owner may 
be required to defend its trademark in local courts, regardless of the scope of the 
infringement. 
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PROPOSAL ON JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2009), available at http://www.tomeika.jur.kyushu-
u.ac.jp/ip/pdf/Transparency%20RULES%20%202009%20Nov1.pdf. 
 14. JAMES FAWCETT & PAUL TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW n.7.13 (2d ed. 2011). 
 15. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 1. 
 16. See id. art. 3. 
 17. Paris Convention, art. 6, Mar. 20, 1883, 25 Stat. 1372, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended 1979. 
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A.  IN EUROPE 
In Europe, the territorial approach encompasses both private international 
jurisdiction and choice of law.  As to jurisdiction, the Recast of the Brussels 
Regulation, dealing with jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters, has extended 
exclusive jurisdiction over any proceedings concerning the validity of a trademark 
to the courts of the Member State in which that trademark is registered, irrespective 
of whether the issue is raised by way of an action or as a defense.18  With this new 
rule, enacted in Article 24, the Recast codifies the controversial holding in the 
Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik (GAT) case.19  In that case, the alleged infringer 
sued the owner of a French patent in Germany for a declaratory judgment of non-
infringement, and an incidental issue was raised as to the validity of the patent.20  
Under Article 16(4) of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, courts of the Member State where the 
patent was registered held exclusive jurisdiction over matters related to a patent’s 
validity, but it was unclear whether this included cases in which validity was not 
the original or primary issue.21  The specific question that reached the European 
Court of Justice was whether the court in which the non-infringement action was 
raised could also exercise jurisdiction over proceedings related to the validity of a 
patent, where the issue of validity was raised as a plea in objection.22  The 
European Court of Justice responded by extending the scope of the exclusive 
jurisdiction to encompass all proceedings related to validity, irrespective of whether 
the issue is raised by way of an action or a plea in objection.23  Thus, by raising 
validity as a defense, an alleged infringer can prevent the consolidated adjudication 
of the claims in one nation’s courts.  The owner may still theoretically choose to 
raise its infringement claim in the nation where an infringement issue arises.  
Nevertheless, the owner has no control over keeping the action consolidated if the 
alleged infringer chooses to raise validity as a defense.  The Recast of the Brussels 
Regulation endorses this territorial approach, though not without criticism.24 
This territorial approach, and the resulting fragmentation, extends to choice of 
law determinations under Article 8 of the Rome II Regulation.25  The Rome II 
Regulation governs which law is applicable to noncontractual obligations, and 
 
 18. Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of December 2012 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2012 
O.J. (L 351) 10, 11. 
 19. Case C-4/03, Gesellschaft für Antriebstechnik mbH & Co. v. Lamellen und Kupplungsbau 
Beteiligungs KG, 2006 E.C.R. I-6523. 
 20. Id. at I-6528. 
 21. See id. at I-6525. 
 22. Id. at I-6529. 
 23. Id. at I-6533 to -6534. 
 24. See generally Annette Kur, A Farewell to Cross-Border Injunctions? The ECJ Decisions GAT 
v. LuK and Roche Nederland v. Primus and Goldenberg, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION 
L. 844 (2006). 
 25. Regulation 864/2007, of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 2007 on the Law 
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations, 2006 O.J. (L 199) 45 (EC) [hereinafter Rome II]. 
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Article 8 specifically deals with infringement of intellectual property.26  Under 
Article 8, the applicable law is the law of the country for which the protection is 
claimed.27  Whereas the general lex loci delicti principle in Article 4 of the Rome II 
Regulation allows some exceptions in favor of the law of the habitual residence of 
the alleged infringer and of the person sustaining damage, or more generally in 
favor of the law of the country manifestly more closely connected with the 
infringement,28 the lex loci protectionis rule in Article 8 forbids such exceptions.29  
By the same token, Article 8 does not allow grant the parties autonomy to agree not 
to follow the provision’s lex loci protectionis requirement,30 while such an option is 
generally available for tort.31 
These differences reveal the rigidity of Article 8’s requirements for applicable 
law in intellectual property disputes, compared to the looser rule enacted in Article 
4 of the Rome II Regulation for other disputes.  One consequence of Article 8 is 
that when a mark is infringed in different countries, the law of each country where 
an infringement occurred will be applicable locally.  If the alleged infringer does 
not contest the validity of the titles infringed, the judge of the domicile of the 
defendant may have general jurisdiction allowing consolidation of the claims.  
Nevertheless, in that case, the judge will still apply the law of each nation where an 
infringement occurred, imposing a fragmentation at the choice of law level.  If the 
alleged infringer contests the validity of a title, the combined effect of those two 
European Regulations requires each forum to apply the forum’s law.  Thus, under 
European law, an alleged infringer may oblige the owner to adjudicate locally, 
despite the international scope of the infringement.  The approach endorsed is 
clearly territorial. 
B.  IN THE UNITED STATES 
American law, at first glance, seems less territorial.  Whereas the scope of 
copyright law and the scope of patent law are territorial,32 the Supreme Court 
recognized in the 1952 case Steel v. Bulova Watch Co. that the Lanham Act may 
possess an extra-territorial scope under certain conditions.33  In that case, the U.S. 
citizen defendant had sold watches in Mexico that were assembled in Mexico from 
parts imported from Switzerland and the U.S., and that were stamped with the 
name “Bulova.”34  The name “Bulova” was registered in the U.S. (but not in 
 
 26. Id.  See also Edouard Treppoz, Rome 2, in CONCISE INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 555 (Pierre Veron ed., 2d ed. 2011). 
 27. Rome II, supra note 25, at 45. 
 28. Id. at 44. 
 29. Id. at 45. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 46. 
 32. See, e.g., Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 441 (2007). 
 33. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952); see also Curtis Bradley, 
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997). 
 34. Bulova, 344 U.S. at 281–82. 
EDOUARD TREPPOZ, INTERNATIONAL CHOICE OF LAW IN TRADEMARK DISPUTES, 37 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 557 (2014) 
562 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [37:4 
Mexico) by the plaintiff Bulova Watch Company, which brought suit when some of 
the watches crossed the border into the U.S.35  Regardless of the infringement’s 
partial location in Mexico, the Supreme Court recognized the application of the 
Lanham Act to the conduct.  This extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act 
was justified by the defendant’s American citizenship, the effect of the conduct in 
the U.S. and the absence of any conflict with foreign law.36  The result could be 
that the Lanham Act will be applied to infringement that is partially committed 
abroad.  Thus, while European law excludes any consolidation as to choice of law, 
American law might offer such a consolidation by extraterritorial application of the 
Lanham Act. 
Despite this potential extraterritorial scope, the outcome under American law 
seems the same as under European law.  The owner of the trademark still must 
adjudicate in the country where the right was granted.  Such an approach is clearly 
upheld by the famous Vanity Fair case.37  The plaintiff in that case, U.S. company 
Vanity Fair Mills, was engaged in the sale of women’s underwear in the U.S. and 
in Canada.38  The plaintiff registered its trademark in the U.S. in 1914, but its 
application was rejected in Canada because of a prior registration by Eaton 
Company, a Canadian Corporation.39  Beginning in 1953, the Canadian company 
sold the plaintiff’s branded merchandise and cheaper merchandise of Canadian 
manufacture under the same trademark, “Vanity Fair.”40  The plaintiff claimed that 
the defendant had advertised in the United States under the trademark and had sold 
some merchandise to customers residing in the United States.41  It asserted that the 
U.S. court had jurisdiction over all parts of the action, encompassing the sales in 
Canada, and that the law applicable to the whole action should be the Lanham Act, 
in accordance with its extraterritorial application.42  The plaintiff argued that this 
case was controlled by the Bulova case, since the defendant’s use of the mark 
“Vanity Fair” in Canada had a substantial effect in the U.S.43  Nevertheless, the 
Second Circuit determined that the Bulova case did not lend support to the plaintiff, 
mainly because the defendant was Canadian, whereas the defendant in the Bulova 
case was an American citizen.44  The court then concluded “that the remedies 
provided by the Lanham Act . . . should not be given an extraterritorial application 
against foreign citizens acting under presumably valid trade-marks in a foreign 
country.”45 
As to choice of law, the result is the same fragmentation of applicable laws.  
Furthermore, the Second Circuit linked the non-application of the Lanham Act to 
 
 35. Id. at 282. 
 36. Id. at 285–89. 
 37. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956). 
 38. Id. at 637. 
 39. Id. at 637–38. 
 40. Id. at 638. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 641. 
 44. Id. at 642. 
 45. Id. at 643. 
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Canadian sales to the scope of jurisdiction.  The issue was whether the American 
court could exercise jurisdiction over questions relating to those Canadian sales, 
even though the American law was not applicable.46  Based on the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens, the Second Circuit found that the court below had not 
abused its discretion by refusing to entertain the claim of trademark infringement 
occurring in Canada.47  For the Second Circuit, the crucial issue was the validity of 
the defendant’s trademark registration under Canadian trademark law:  U.S. courts 
should “not determine the validity of the acts of a foreign sovereign done within its 
borders.”48  It is striking that, as under European Law, the United States applies a 
strict territorial approach to issues of validity.  The result is thus exactly the same 
as under European law:  a double fragmentation requiring plaintiffs to sue in any 
jurisdiction where an infringement occurred. 
II.  THE PERSEVERANCE OF TERRITORIALITY DESPITE THE 
INTERNET’S GROWTH 
With the growth of the Internet, these territorial approaches seem less sensible.  
First, determining the place of infringement appears nearly impossible.  A cyber-
infringement initially seems difficult to locate in one country, because it occurs on 
the Internet and ignores boundaries.  Though difficult, the problem is not 
impossible to solve.49  Additionally, international contracts have multiple 
connections with various countries.  However, one easy solution is to choose one 
connecting factor to determine the applicable law.  Although a vexing question, the 
problem of the location of a tort is not novel.  Paul de Voët raised the same 
problem three hundred years ago with his archer sending an arrow from one 
country to another.50  The problem remains the same and depends on the selection 
of a relevant connecting factor.  On both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, the solution 
has traditionally been to adopt targeting criteria, which reduces partially, but not 
totally, the number of laws potentially applicable to a cyber infringement.  It 
remains the case that a territorial fragmentation results for those acting globally via 
the Internet, and especially for the Internet service providers (ISPs) facing 
secondary liability actions under many laws. 
As illustrated by the arrow of Paul de Voët, the first option purports to choose 
between the departure and the arrival of the arrow (i.e., the location of the source of 
the tort and the location of the effects of the tort).  In the context of the Internet, 
this option remains available, but with one major difference.  Instead of one point 
 
 46. Id. at 645. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 646. 
 49. See Joachim Zekoll, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, in BEYOND TERRITORIALITY:  
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 341 (Gunther Handl et al., eds. 
2012). 
 50. A. Weill, Un cas épineux de compétence législative en matière de responsabilité délictuelle:  
dissociation de l’acte générateur de responsabilité et du lieu du préjudice, 1 MELANGES MAURY 548 
n.7 (quoting PAUL DE VOËT, DE STATUTIS EORUMQUE CONCURSI lect.1 (1700)). 
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of arrival, there are many local points of arrival.  Thus, choosing the departure—
that is, the source of the emission—may appear to be the best solution.  In that case, 
one law would be applied on an extraterritorial basis, instead of multiple laws being 
applied on a fragmented basis.  This advantage was explained under European 
copyright law, where the place of emission was retained to localize the act of 
communication to the public by satellite.51  However, it seems inapt to compare 
satellite broadcasting and Internet communication.  Whereas the place of emission 
for a satellite broadcast is difficult to manipulate, the place of emission for an 
Internet communication is comparatively easy to manipulate.  The main risk of 
applying laws based on the place of emission would be the development of some 
trademark-free paradise, from where one could communicate to locations all over 
the world.  Such a risk was considered by the European Court of Justice, which 
disapproved the place of emission rule.  One question raised in the well-known 
case L’Oréal SA v. eBay International AG was whether the European rules on 
trademark were applicable to offers of sale on an online marketplace targeting a 
third country.52  The Court answered in the negative, explaining: 
If it were otherwise, operators which use electronic commerce by offering for sale, on 
an online market place targeted at consumers within the EU, trade-marked goods 
located in a third State, which it is possible to view on the screen and to order via that 
marketplace, would, so far as offers for sale of that type are concerned, have no 
obligation to comply with the EU intellectual property rules.  Such a situation would 
have an impact on the effectiveness (effet utile) of those rules.53 
In order to promote the effectiveness of trademark rules, the place of emission 
should be rejected as a connecting factor.  American case law, in retaining such a 
connecting factor for copyright law, reveals the undermining effects of location by 
the server.54  One could get around the rule by strategically choosing the location of 
one’s servers, which diminishes the effectiveness of the American law.  Thus, I 
recommend the European approach, favoring the place of the effects of an act as a 
connecting factor. 
Favoring the place of arrival does not end the analysis.  There are different ways 
to identify those places of reception.  One approach is technical, whereas the other 
approach is legal.  A technical approach would purport to locate the act everywhere 
 
 51. Council Directive 93/83, of the European Economic Community of 27 September 1993 on the 
Coordination of Certain Rules Concerning Copyright and Rights Related to Copyright Applicable to 
Satellite Broadcasting and Cable Retransmission, 1993 O.J. (L 248) 19 (EC) (“The act of 
communication to the public by satellite occurs solely in the Member State where, under the control and 
responsibility of the broadcasting organization, the program-carrying signals are introduced into an 
uninterrupted chain of communication leading to the satellite and down towards the earth.”). 
 52. Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-06011. 
 53. Id. at n.62. 
 54. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V., 2013 WL 4777189 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2013).  For a 
detailed discussion of the legal issues raised by two unsuccessful pieces of U.S. legislation (PIPA and 
SOPA) targeting foreign “rogue” Web sites hosting links to alleged copyright-infringing content, see 
Mike Belleville, IP Wars:  SOPA, PIPA and the Fight over Online Piracy, 26 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. 
L.J., 303 (2012). 
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the allegedly infringing Web site is accessible.  On the other hand, the legal 
approach requires that the Web site has targeted the country in order to locate the 
act in that country; mere access would not suffice to locate the act.  A Joint 
Recommendation from the World Intellectual Property Organization favored the 
targeting approach in 2001, at least with respect to choice of law.55  For European 
Law, the L’Oréal case strongly rejects the criterion of accessibility, instead 
retaining the criterion of targeting.56  This approach was later applied to an 
infringement of a sui-generis database right.57  Under American law, the First 
Circuit ruled the same way in the case McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd.58  Cecil McBee, 
an American jazz bassist, contested the unauthorized use by Delica, a Japanese 
clothing retailer, of his name as a trade name.59  The plaintiff contended that the 
Lanham Act should be applicable to the Japanese retailer, due to its extraterritorial 
scope as recognized in the Bulova case.60  Moreover, he sought injunctive relief 
that would bar all access in the United States to Delica’s Web site.61  Limiting the 
extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act against noncitizen defendants to 
instances where the defendant’s activities had substantial effects on United States 
commerce, the court held that the activity of Delica’s Web site was not subject to 
the Act.62  In particular, the court observed that the Web site hosted from Japan was 
written in Japanese, and was thus unlikely to be understood by enough Americans 
to have a substantial effect in America.63  The court condemned the technical 
criterion of accessibility, which failed to appreciate “the nature of the Internet” and 
which would lead to a “senseless” outcome.”64  The court recognized that “the 
mere existence of a website that is visible in a forum . . . is not enough . . . .  
Something more is necessary, such as interactive features which allow the 
successful online ordering of the defendant’s products.”65  The court thus preferred 
the criterion of targeting to the criterion of accessibility, demonstrating a 
 
 55. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., JOINT RECOMMENDATION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO), CONCERNING PROVISIONS ON THE 
PROTECTION OF MARKS, AND OTHER INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SIGNS ON THE INTERNET 7–8 
(2001), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/freepublications/en/marks/845/pub845.pdf. 
 56. L’Oréal, 2011 E.C.R. I-06011 (“[I]f the fact that an online marketplace is accessible from [a] 
territory were sufficient for the advertisements displayed there to be within the scope of Directive 
89/104 and Regulation No 40/94, Web sites and advertisements which, although obviously targeted 
solely at consumers in third States, are nevertheless technically accessible from EU territory would 
wrongly be subject to EU law.”). 
 57. See Case C-173/11, Football Dataco Ltd. v. Sportradar GmbH, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 (case 
regarding an alleged infringement by Sportradar of the sui generis right which Football Dataco and 
others claimed in a database of football league matches). 
 58. See McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107, 120 n.9 (1st Cir. 2005) (“We need not and do 
not decide whether a defendant’s intent to target United States commerce plays any role in the 
jurisdictional inquiry for purposes of extraterritorial application of the Lanham Act.”). 
 59. Id. at 111. 
 60. Id. at 116. 
 61. Id. at 111. 
 62. Id. at 124. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 123. 
 65. Id. at 124. 
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convergence between European and American law.  This adoption of the criterion 
of targeting reveals that neither system endorses a technical view of the Internet.  
The result is to limit the applicable laws that the owner of a Web site must comply 
with.  Although this narrowing solution offers some predictability, the fact remains 
that those acting on the Internet on a global scale must respect as many laws as the 
local markets they target contain.  In the end, territoriality remains. 
The situation is particularly tricky for ISPs facing claims as both primary 
infringers and contributory infringers.  To avoid both types of liability, ISPs would 
potentially have to comply with all the laws of the world.  As a potential primary 
infringer, if the ISP targets a worldwide audience, it would theoretically be required 
to comply with the laws of every nation.  As a potential secondary infringer, it 
seems that an ISP’s liability would depend on the law(s) applicable to the primary 
infringement.  Under the Rome II Regulation, such dependence is recognized in 
Article 15, which states that the law applicable to the primary infringement is 
applicable to “the determination of persons who may be held liable for acts 
performed by them.”66 
This approach could be useful, as illustrated by the L’Oréal case.  If eBay were 
characterized as a primary infringer, the applicable law might have been the law of 
each targeted country.  If eBay were not characterized as a primary infringer, the 
process could be divided into two steps.  First, one could determine the law 
applicable to the primary infringer—the party offering the counterfeited goods for 
sale.  The laws applicable are the same as previously discussed.  Second, the 
indirect liability of eBay would depend on the laws found to be applicable to the 
primary infringement.  In both cases, eBay must comply with as many laws as 
countries targeted.  This result may explain why the lines between primary and 
indirect liability sometimes seem blurred in the case law.  (Though it is interesting 
to note that in a case rendered by the European Court of Justice on design 
protection, the Court directly determined the law applicable to the indirect 
infringement, skipping the first step of identifying the law applicable to the primary 
infringement.67) 
In the U.S., the law applied to secondary infringement is also dependent on the 
law applicable to the primary infringement, as the recent decision in Perfect 10 v. 
Yandex reveals.  This case focused on Yandex’s search engine, which was located 
in Russia and queried both Web and image searches.68  Perfect 10, a California 
company in the business of creating copyrighted adult entertainment products, 
brought direct, vicarious and contributory infringement claims against Yandex.69  
The Court rejected direct infringement based on the location of the servers outside 
 
 66. Regulation (EC) No. 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 
on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199). 
 67. Case C-5/11, Titus Alexander Jochen Donner, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000 (finding that defendant 
aided and abetted the commercial exploitation of copyright-protected works). 
 68. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V., No. C 12-01521, 2013 WL 4777189, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
6, 2013). 
 69. Id. at *2. 
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of the United States.70  As to the indirect infringement claim, the Court recalled the 
well-known ruling in Subafilms,71 affirming that “a primary activity outside the 
boundaries of the United States, not constituting an infringement cognizable under 
the Copyright Act, cannot serve as the basis for holding liable under the Copyright 
Act one who is merely related to that activity within the United States.”72  Then, the 
question becomes whether the primary infringement is territorial and accordingly 
cognizable under the U.S. Copyright Act.  The answer being negative, indirect 
liability could not exist under the U.S. copyright law.73  This illustrates how 
contributory infringement is dependent on the primary infringement.  Such a 
fragmented approach has been criticized as excluding any predictable solution, 
especially for service providers acting on a global scale and thus facing the risk of 
being deemed liable under an unpredictable law.74 
If improvement is necessary, the next question is how to overtake territoriality to 
improve choice of law solutions. 
III.  MEANS OF IMPROVEMENT 
Scholarly works, especially the ALI and CLIP Principles,75 have suggested a 
path to improvement by using private international law to overtake territoriality.76  
Consolidation of infringement claims in a single forum under a single law is almost 
uniformly recommended,77 but the law that should be applicable to contributory 
infringement remains disputed. 
A. THE CONSOLIDATION 
The first means of improvement, for which a consensus exists among the 
Principles, proposes to consolidate infringement actions for adjudication in one 
 
 70. Id. at *4. 
 71. Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1099 (1994) (“We hold that the 
mere authorization of acts of infringement that are not cognizable under the United States copyright 
laws because they occur entirely outside of the United States does not state a claim for infringement 
under the Copyright Act.”). 
 72. Id. at *7 (quoting Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1093). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Annette Kur, The Law 
Applicable to Secondary Liability in Intellectual Property Cases, 42 N.Y.U. J.L. INT’L L. & POL. 201 
(2009). 
 75. For a comparative study of the principles of the American Law Institute and the Max Planck 
Institute on Private International Law and Intellectual Property, see Edouard Treppoz, Private 
International Law and Intellectual Property—New Frame for New Strategies, 2010 LAMY 271 (2010). 
 76. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private International Intellectual 
Property Law:  The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711 (2009) (arguing that the 
territoriality principle’s operation in intellectual property law has played too substantial a role in 
preventing the proper development of principles of private international law). 
 77. For a presentation of the convergences among American, European and Asian Principles, see 
TOSHIYUKI KONO & PAULIUS JURCYS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW:  
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 37, 71 (Toshiyuki Kono ed., 2012). 
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forum under a single law.78  As for jurisdiction, the instrument of consolidation is 
already established (albeit ignored) in Europe, and requires limiting the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the judge of the title to issues raised by way of an action.79  The 
jurisdiction of the domicile of the defendant would thus become a real option for 
the plaintiff benefiting from a general jurisdiction, regardless of any issues raised as 
to the validity of titles by defense.  It nevertheless would remain the case that the 
judge would have to apply as many laws as countries targeted; consolidation ends 
at jurisdiction.  Here, also, there is a way to consolidate the choice of law.  Such a 
means attempts to shift from the application of all law for which the protection is 
sought to the law that is most closely connected to the circumstances of the alleged 
infringement and the parties (the “most closely connected law”).  The CLIP and 
ALI Principles share the will to consolidate by applying a single law, but their 
modalities differ.80 
While the ALI Principles allow the application of a single law to ubiquitous 
infringement, the CLIP Principles limit the exception to the use of a ubiquitous 
medium such as the Internet.81  Indeed, it is not easy to determine with certainty 
when an infringement becomes ubiquitous.  The CLIP approach is to limit the rule 
not by the scope of the infringement, but by the tool used.  Therefore, when 
committed on the Internet, an infringement is potentially ubiquitous, justifying the 
application of a single law.  The boundary will ultimately depend on the technology 
used.82  This technological boundary was adopted by the European Court of Justice 
in the case eDate, in which the court limited the benefit of a forum actoris to 
infringement of personality rights committed on the Internet.83  Though far from 
being perfect, this technological boundary is nevertheless the “least bad” solution. 
Another difference between the CLIP and ALI Principles involves the factors 
taken into account in determining which law has the closest connection to a case.  
While the CLIP Principles grant great importance to the infringer in order to offer 
predictability to potential defendants, the ALI Principles focus on the relationship 
between the parties, offering a more balanced inquiry into the closest connection.84  
Without any doubt, the parties’ habitual place of residence or place of business 
should be considered the most important factor in determining the closely 
connected law, allowing the switch from multiple laws to one single law.  In fact, 
this seems to be a good solution whenever it is possible, since it adopts a balanced 
attitude and avoids favoring either the defendant or the owner.  This is why the ALI 
Principles, which take into account the markets targeted or the investments made,85 
 
 78. See, e.g., id. 
 79. See generally BENEDETTA UBERTAZZI, EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY (2012) (proposing a new interpretation of the territoriality principle as an expression of the 
proximity principle that determines which court has international jurisdiction and which law is 
applicable). 
 80. See Treppoz, supra note 75. 
 81. ALI Principles, supra note 11, § 321; CLIP Principles, supra note 12, at 18. 
 82. See CLIP Principles, supra note 12, at 18. 
 83. Joined Cases C-509/09 & C-161/10, eDate Advertising GmbH v. X, 2011 E.C.J. I-10269. 
 84. CLIP Principles, supra note 12, at 18; ALI Principles, supra note 11, § 321. 
 85. ALI Principles, supra note 11, § 321. 
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seem like a good option.  When the owner and the defendant direct their activities 
toward the same country, the law of that country should be applicable as the most 
closely connected law.  Nevertheless, when there is no common market, activities 
or residence, the determination of the most closely connected law remains difficult.  
In such cases, the residence of the victim may be an alternative solution,86 despite 
its exclusion by both Principles. 
As to jurisdiction under American law, it has been held that under certain 
circumstances, the damage may be localized in its entirety at the domicile of the 
victim.87  External to the Internet, this connecting factor is predictable for the user 
and for the author.  Moreover, the closest jurisdiction is determined at the point of 
arrival of the infringement, which constitutes the victim’s residence.  In this regard, 
the law of the victim’s residence appears to be the appropriate law for complex 
cases of international infringements on the Internet. 
Despite the aforementioned minor discrepancies and criticisms, consensus exists 
and should be followed by legislators in order to overtake territoriality.  Such a 
move should allow adjudication in one forum under one law for a cyber 
infringement of a mark exploited on a worldwide basis. 
B.  THE DEPENDENCE OF CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT ON THE PRIMARY 
INFRINGEMENT 
One remaining question as to improvement of the law relates to the dependence 
of contributory infringement on the primary infringement, and whether legislators 
should go further in breaking this dependence.  The answer is positive in the CLIP 
Principles,88 whereas the ALI Principles would maintain such dependence.89  
 
 86. François Dessemontet, Le droit applicable à la propriété intellectuelle dans le Cyber-Espace, 
in COMMERCE ELECTRONIQUE ET PROPRIETES INTELLECTUELLES 97 n.40 (2001). 
 87. See Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 16 N.Y.3d 295, 301−02 (N.Y. 2011) (holding 
that in copyright infringement cases involving the uploading of copyrighted printed literary work to the 
Internet, the residence or location of the principal place of business of the copyright holder, rather than 
the location of the infringement, is the situs of injury), dismissed on remand on other grounds, Penguin 
Grp. (USA), Inc. v. Am. Buddha, No. 09 Civ. 528(RA), 2013 WL 865486 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013). 
 88. The section in CLIP Principles on secondary infringement states: 
(1) Subject to paragraph 2, the law applicable to liability based upon acts or conduct that induce, 
contribute to or further an infringement is the same as the law applicable to that infringement. 
(2) In case of facilities or services being offered or rendered that are capable of being used for 
infringing and non-infringing purposes by a multitude of users without intervention of  the 
person offering or rendering the facilities or services in relation to the individual acts resulting in 
infringement, the law applicable to the liability of that person is the law of the State where the 
centre of gravity of her/his activities relating to those facilities or services is located. 
(3) The law designated by paragraph 2 shall only apply if it provides at least for the following 
substantive  standards: 
(a) liability for failure to react in case of actual knowledge of a primary infringement or 
in case of a manifest infringement and 
(b) liability for active inducement. 
(4) Paragraph 2 does not apply to claims relating to information on the identity and the  activities 
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Under the CLIP Principles, an ISP could count on the application of one sole law—
that is,its home nation’s law—as to its indirect liability.90  Accordingly, the indirect 
liability of Google, for example, would be considered under American law, 
whereas the indirect liability of Xander would be governed by Netherlands law, 
regardless of the law applicable to the main infringement.  The goal is clearly to 
offer predictability to those companies acting on a global basis, by requiring them 
to comply solely with the standards of their local laws.  If technical, such a break is 
nevertheless mainly political.  The center of gravity for the applicable law is no 
longer the infringement committed, but the commercial activities conducted, 
outlining the political move from intellectual property to freedom of trade. 
Although attractive at first sight, such a move should nevertheless be contested 
in favor of the dependence favored by the ALI Principles.  The dependence 
between the law applicable to the main infringement and the law applicable to the 
contributory infringement should be maintained for technical and political reasons.  
Technically, if two different laws were applicable to the main infringement and the 
contributory infringement, the boundary between those two categories could be 
considered a primary characterization.  Accordingly, such a characterization should 
be submitted to the lex fori.91  Yet, domestic law and comparative law teach us that 
such a line is difficult to draw and subject to discrepancies under the applicable 
law.92  Such uncertainty in domestic law and discrepancies in comparative law 
would create too easy a playground for those prone to forum shopping.  
Furthermore, the predictability offered by the application of a single law would be 
polluted, if not destroyed, by the application of the lex fori to the determination of 
this boundary. 
Following this and at the edge of law and politics, the break in the dependence 
will end the classical construction of private international law reflecting domestic 
law.93  Under domestic law, a contributory infringement requires a primary 
infringement.  This prerequisite outlines the coherence and the unity between those 
two questions of infringement.  By splitting those two questions between two 
different laws, private international law would break the unity and potentially the 
 
of primary infringers. 
CLIP Principles, supra note 12, at 18–19. 
 89. See ALI Principles, supra note 11, § 301 (stating that in cases regarding facilitation of 
infringement, “the law that governs the determination of primary infringement applies”). 
 90. CLIP Principles, supra note 12, at 19. 
 91. Ernest G. Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classification, or Characterization Problem in the 
Conflict of Laws, 50 YALE L.J., 743, 761 (1941) (concluding that “questions of characterization should 
be resolved on the basis of the lex fori”). 
 92. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Secondary Liability for Online Trademark 
Infringement:  The International Landscape, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 463 (2014); Stacey Dogan, 
Principled Standards vs. Boundless Discretion:  A Tale of Two Approaches to Intermediary Trademark 
Liability Online, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 503 (2014); Annette Kur, Secondary Liability for Trademark 
Infringement on the Internet:  The Situation in Germany and Throughout the EU, 37 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 525 (2014); Du Ying, Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement Online:  Legislation and 
Judicial Decisions in China, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 541 (2014). 
 93. See, e.g., Étienne Bartin, De l’impossibilité d’arriver à la suppression définitive des conflits 
de lois, 24 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE [J.D.I] 478 (1897) (Fr.). 
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coherence of each domestic law.  Suppose that State A retains a large scope for 
primary infringement and offers a strong safe harbor for contributory infringement.  
On the flip side, State B retains a restricted scope for primary infringement but a 
minimal safe harbor for contributory infringement.  For the same acts committed 
within domestic borders, State A characterizes the ISP as a primary infringer, 
whereas State B characterizes the ISP as a secondary infringer not benefiting from 
the safe harbor.  Thus, each domestic system leads to the same result, the liability 
of the ISP.  Let’s imagine now that the same conduct for the primary infringement 
is located in State B, but the ISP is located in State A.  In that case, the “dépeçage” 
will submit the primary infringement to the law of B, which refuses to consider the 
ISP a primary infringer, and the contributory infringement to the law of A, allowing 
the ISP to benefit from the safe harbor.  Whereas each law, applied alone, would 
have considered the ISP liable, the “dépeçage” leads to the opposite result, wherein 
the ISP is not liable.  The break of coherence is hardly questionable in asking for 
the application of the same law for primary and contributory infringement.  The 
coherent construction of each domestic system on those intertwined issues should 
not be destroyed by the application of two different laws. 
Finally, from a strictly political point of view, a specific choice of law rule 
would tip the balance in favor of freedom of trade and against intellectual property 
by allowing service providers to choose the applicable law.  The threat is that some 
ISPs will decide to entrench themselves in countries offering the largest safe 
harbor.  Trademark owners could still fight against the primary infringer, but it 
would become much more complicated to fight against the ISP protected by their  
choice of local laws with large safe harbors.  The infringement would be 
recognized under the law applicable to the primary infringement, but since the ISP 
would not be considered indirectly liable, the only chance to end the infringement 
would be to find the primary infringer.  Accordingly, without any claim against the 
ISP, the chase against the infringement on the Internet would become increasingly 
difficult.  The freedom of trade of those companies would be heightened, but the 
protection of intellectual property on the Internet would be undermined. 
Such a political move seems too bold.  The growth of the Internet is related to 
protected content circulating on the Internet.  Such growth should be respectful of 
the protection of intellectual property, regardless of its remaining territoriality.  The 
universality of the technology used should not always lead to the application of a 
single law.  Rather, it might still be possible (and preferable) to apply laws on a 
local basis.  The choice of law solutions on the Internet should not endorse only a 
technical and free trade view.  When local values have to be protected on a local 
basis, a fragmented approach should be preferred.  As to intellectual property, it is 
nevertheless preferable to apply a single law for primary infringement committed 
on the Internet.  By way of consequence, ISPs would not be required to follow all 
laws of the world, but only a single law applicable to the primary infringement, 
recalling the deep link between primary and contributory infringement.  This 
dependence seems to be a better solution, especially when consolidation is retained 
at both jurisdictional and choice of law levels.  Such an improvement will 
overcome a strict territorial approach, bridging law and economics.  
